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Abstract—This paper proposes a bandwidth-efﬁcient transmis-
sion protocol with one source, one destination and two assisting
half-duplex relays. The two relays operate alternately in a time-
division-duplex mode to forward messages from source to desti-
nation in the presence of an eavesdropper. Therefore, the source
transmits new information continuously and the bandwidth
efﬁciency of ideal full-duplex relay network can be achieved. The
two relays provide higher diversity gain compared to the existing
schemes assisted by one relay. By considering the achievable
secrecy rate as the minimum between the secrecy rate of the S-R
and R-D links, the achievable secrecy capacity can be improved.
We investigate the performance of the protocol in terms of ergodic
secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability and compared to
the existing half-duplex relaying, full-duplex relaying and full-
duplex jamming schemes. The proposed protocol achieves the
highest ergodic secrecy capacity and the lowest probability of
secrecy outage compared to the existing schemes.
Index Terms—Physical layer secrecy, cooperative relay net-
works, two-path successive relaying, secrecy capacity, secrecy
outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ﬁfth generation (5G) network will serve as a key enabler
in meeting the continuously increasing demands for future
wireless applications, including an ultra-high data rate, an
ultra-wide radio coverage, an ultra-large number of devices,
and an ultra-low latency [1]. Owing to the broadcast nature of
wireless channels, the security of 5G wireless network from
eavesdropping remains one of the core challenges. Tradition-
ally, information security has been addressed in the upper
layers based on cryptographic methods. Recently, physical
layer security is identiﬁed as a promising strategy that provides
secure wireless transmissions by exploring the characteristics
of the wireless channel.
The cooperative relaying approach has great potential to
provide substantial beneﬁts not only in terms of reliability (di-
versity gain) and rate (bandwidth or spectral efﬁciency), also
has the capability to enhance wireless security [2]–[4]. A con-
ventional half-duplex relay cannot transmit and receive signal
simultaneously in the same frequency channel. Therefore, the
source has to keep silent and stop transmission of new message
during the relay transmission phase. As a result, the spectral
efﬁciency for conventional half-duplex relay is only half of
the spectral efﬁciency of direct transmission. A full-duplex
relay can receive and transmit signals at the same time in the
same channel is proposed to improve the spectral efﬁciency of
cooperative relaying transmission. However, the reception of
the full-duplex relay is interfered with its own transmission,
which is called self-interference. The self-interference can be
minimised by sophisticated hardware and/or advanced signal
processing which signiﬁcantly increases the cost and com-
plexity of relay nodes [5]–[7]. Compared to full-duplex relay,
the implementation of a half-duplex relay is much easier and
cheaper. Two-path successive relaying is proposed to achieve
the full-duplex spectral efﬁciency by scheduling a pair of half-
duplex relays to assist the source transmission alternately [8].
Existing literature mainly considers the TPSR in conventional
scenarios without eavesdroppers [9]–[13]. The performance of
TPSR in secrecy communication remains open.
In this paper, we propose a secrecy two-path successive
relaying protocol. We evaluate the performance of the two-
path successive relaying network in terms of secrecy capacity
and secrecy outage probability and compared to half-duplex re-
laying, full-duplex relaying and full-duplex jamming schemes
in [14].
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND TRANSMISSION PROTOCOL
A. System Model
Consider a wireless network consisting of one source (S),
one destination (D), and two half-duplex relays (R1 and R2)
in the presence of an eavesdropper (E) as shown in Figure
1, where all nodes are equipped with a single antenna. The
eavesdropper can intercept the transmission from source and
one relay during each time-slot, simultaneously. The R1 and
R2 apply the decode-and-forward protocol. We assume that
direct S-to-D link is not available, so transmission from S to
D requires the assisting of R1 and R2.
We assume that all channels experience block Rayleigh
fading and that the channels remain constant over one block
but vary independently from one block to another. The channel
coefﬁcient from node i to node j is denoted as hij and
reciprocal (hij = hji). The noise at relays (R1 and R2), D
and E are denoted as nr(t), nd(t) and ne(t) with variances of
σ2r , σ
2
d and σ
2
e respectively. The transmit power, P of source
and relays are subject to unit power constraint.
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Figure 1: The secrecy two-path successive relaying (TPSR)
network with an eavesdropper.
B. Transmission Protocol
The transmission protocol of two-path successive relaying
(TPSR) is divided into T + 1 consecutive equal-duration
time-slots and S transmits independent codeword xs(t), t =
1, 2, . . . , T continuously. The protocol is alternated by odd
time-slot stage and even time-slot stage.
• In odd time-slot (to = 1, 3, . . . , T + 1), S transmits
xs(to) and R2 forwards xs(to − 1). R1 receives xs(to)
from S while being interfered with by R2 and D receives
xs(to−1) from R2. E receives xs(to) from S while being
interfered with by R2.
• In even time-slot (te = 2, 4, . . . , T ), S transmits xs(te)
and R1 forwards xs(te − 1). R2 receives xs(te) from
S while being interfered with by R1 and D receives
xs(te−1) from R1. E receives xs(te) from S while being
interfered with by R1.
In the ﬁrst time-slot (t = 1) and the last time slot (t = T +1),
R2 and S transmit artiﬁcial noise respectively to deteriorate
the receiving signal of E from S. The protocol using T + 1
time-slots to deliver T codewords from S to D, resulting in
a bandwidth utilization efﬁciency equal to T/(T + 1), which
approaches to one as T → ∞.
The received signal at R1, D and E in to are respectively
given by
yr1(to) =
√
P hsr1xs(to) +
√
P hrrxs(to − 1) + nr(to), (1)
yd(to) =
√
P hr2d xs(to − 1) + nd(to), (2)
ye(to) =
√
P hse xs(to) +
√
P hr2e xs(to − 1) + ne(to). (3)
The received signal at R2, D and E in te are similar to
(1), (2) and (3) respectively by simply exchanging subscript
R1 and R2. The the inter-relay interference can be mitigated
effectively by spacing the two distributed relays sufﬁciently
apart.
III. SECRECY CAPACITY
In [14], the secrecy capacity is deﬁned as (see [15]),
Cs = [Ct − Ce]+, (4)
where [x]+ = max(x, 0), Ct and Ce are the capacities for
data transmission and eavesdropping respectively. Since, the
relay apply decode-and-forward relaying, the capacity for data
transmission is given by
Ct = min (Csr, Crd) , (5)
where Csr and Crd are the capacities for S-to-R and R-to-D
channels. For the eavesdropping capacity, Ce, the eavesdropper
can decode the data from either S or R. Secrecy capacity can
be deﬁned as
Cs = min (Ssr, Srd) , (6)
where Ssr and Srd are the secrecy rates for S-to-R and R-to-D
channels.
A. Independent Secrecy Transmission Rate
The secrecy rates for S-to-R1 and R1-to-D channels are
given by
Ssr1 =
T
2(T + 1)
[log
2
(1 +
P |hsr1 |2
P |hrr|2 + σ2r
)
− log
2
(1 +
P |hse|2
P |hr2e|2 + σ2e
)]+, (7)
Sr1d =
T
2(T + 1)
[log2(1 +
P |hr1d|2
σ2d
)
− log2(1 +
P |hr1e|2
P |hse|2 + σ2e
)]+, (8)
respectively, where T2(T+1) is the pre-log secrecy capacity of
R1. Then, secrecy capacity of R1 is given as
CR1 = min (Ssr1 , Sr1d) . (9)
Similarly, secrecy capacity of R2 can be deﬁned by simply ex-
changing subscript R1 and R2 in (7), (8) and (9) respectively.
Finally, the secrecy capacity for two-path successive relaying
(TPSR) is the sum of CR1 and CR2 as follows
C
TPSR
= CR1 + CR2 . (10)
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
From (10), the secrecy outage probability for the TPSR is
given by
P
TPSR
= P (C
TPSR
< rs)
= P (CR1 + CR2 < rs) , (11)
where rs is the target secrecy rate.
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Figure 2: Ergodic secrecy capacity versus SNR where γsr =
γrd, γse = γre = 10dB and the inter-relay interference and
self-interference, γrr = 0dB.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, several Monte Carlo simulation results
are provided to investigate the secrecy performance of the
proposed two-path successive relaying (TPSR). The secrecy
performance of TPSR is compared to the half-duplex relaying
(HDR), full-duplex relaying (FDR) and full-duplex jamming
(FDJ) schemes. In the FDR, the full-duplex relay can receive
xs(t) from S and forward the previously decoded xs(t − 1)
to D simultaneously at time slot t. But, when the relay is
receiving xs(t) from S, it is interfered by its own transmission
which is called self-interference. In the FDJ, the full-duplex
relay and S transmits jamming signal to E at time slot t and
time slot t + 1 respectively to deteriorate the eavesdropping
capacity. This decreases the spectral efﬁciency of FDJ to 1/2.
The details of the comparison schemes are presented in [14].
In the following simulations, the noise variances of all nodes
and the transmit power of source and relay, P are normalized
to unity. There are T = 1000 independent codewords have to
be transmitted by S.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the ergodic secrecy capacity
versus SNR of various schemes when γsr = γrd, inter-relay
interference and residual self-interference, γrr = P/σ2r =
0dB and γse = γre = 10dB (weak eavesdropping channels)
and γse = γre = 30dB (strong eavesdropping channels)
respectively. Regardless of weak or strong eavesdropping
channels, the FDR and FDJ achieve higher ergodic secrecy
capacity than the HDR. This is because the FDR has a
higher spectral efﬁciency compared to HDR, whereas the
FDJ employs jamming technique to interfere the eavesdropper.
When the eavesdropping channels are strong, the jamming
technique beneﬁts the FDJ, whereas the secrecy capacity of
the FDR is decreased by the increased eavesdropping capacity.
On the other hand, the proposed TPSR shows its robustness
by achieving the similar ergodic secrecy capacity in both cases
and outperforms the other schemes signiﬁcantly. The higher
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Figure 3: Ergodic secrecy capacity versus SNR where γsr =
γrd, γse = γre = 30dB and the inter-relay interference and
self-interference, γrr = 0dB.
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Figure 4: Secrecy outage probability versus SNR where γsr =
γrd, γse = γre = 10dB, rs = 1 bits/s/Hz and the inter-relay
interference and self-interference, γrr = 0dB.
secrecy capacity of TPSR compared to the other schemes is
contributed by the deﬁnition of the secrecy rate in (6) and the
use of two relays.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the secrecy outage probability
versus SNR of various schemes when γsr = γrd, γrr = 0dB,
target secrecy rate, rs = 1bits/s/Hz and γse = γre = 10dB
and γse = γre = 30dB respectively. Same as the former
simulation, the HDR has the worst performance compared
to the other schemes in both cases by achieving the highest
probability of secrecy outage. Based on Figure 4 and Figure 5,
the HDR and FDR only able to deliver the target secrecy rate
when the channel gain of the main channels is greater than the
eavesdropping channels. On the other hand, the FDJ and TPSR
are able deliver the target secrecy rate even the channel gain
of the main channels is less than the eavesdropping channels.
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Figure 5: Secrecy outage probability versus SNR where γsr =
γrd, γse = γre = 30dB, rs = 1 bits/s/Hz and the inter-relay
interference and self-interference, γrr = 0dB.
This shows the robustness of the FDJ and TPSR. In the FDJ,
the eavesdropping capacity is decreased signiﬁcantly when
the eavesdropper has strong eavesdropping channels. This is
because the eavesdropper is interfered by strong jamming
signals when it has strong eavesdropping channels. For the
TPSR, there are several factors that support the TPSR to
achieve the lowest probability of secrecy outage compared to
the other schemes in both cases. The ﬁrst factor is the higher
spectral efﬁciency of TPSR compared to the HDR and FDJ.
The second factor is the higher diversity gain compared to the
other schemes that provided by the two distributed half-duplex
relays in TPSR.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, TPSR is proposed to improve the security for
the transmission of the source and relays from interception.
The numerical results reveal that the proposed TPSR has better
secrecy performance compared to the other schemes in terms
of ergodic secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability.
This is because the proposed TPSR achieves higher spectral
efﬁciency compared to the HDR and FDJ. In additional,
the two half-duplex relays provide higher diversity gain for
the TPSR compared to the FDR. In short, with the TPSR
protocol, the secured wireless transmission can be achieved
by using conventional half-duplex relays without employing
sophisticated jamming techniques.
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